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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
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3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	
4	V •	16 Cr. 371 (RA)
5	MICHELLE MORTON,	
6	Defendant.	
7	x	Sentence (by telephone)
8		New York, N.Y. November 18, 2020 11:00 a.m.
	D. F	11.00 a.m.
10	Before:	
11	HON. RONNIE ABRAMS,	
12		District Judge
13	APPEARANCES	
14	AUDREY STRAUSS	
15	Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York	
16	BY: REBECCA G. MERMELSTEIN Assistant United States Attorney	
17	CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL LLP	
18	Attorneys for Defendant BY: NOLA B. HELLER	
19	SAMANTHA LAWSON	
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(Case called)

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone. This is Judge Abrams.

MS. MERMELSTEIN: Good morning, your Honor. Rebecca Mermelstein, for the government. I'm joined by Negar Tekeei and Elizabeth Hanft, who dialed in on the phone.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. HELLER: Good morning, your Honor. Nola Heller, for Ms. Morton, and I'm joined by Samantha Lawson, who's on video.

THE COURT: All right. Good morning.

And good morning to you, Ms. Morton.

THE DEFENDANT: Good morning.

THE COURT: First, I want to remind everyone that this is a public proceeding. Members of the public and the press are able to access the proceeding through the public call-in number, but any listeners or participants are reminded that any recording or rebroadcasting any portion of this proceeding is prohibited.

We're here for Ms. Morton's sentencing. We are, of course, in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. I'm thus conducting this proceeding remotely pursuant to the authority provided by Section 15002 of the CARES Act and the standing orders issued by our chief judge pursuant to that act. I'm proceeding by videoconference, although I am within the

district, and counsel and Ms. Morton are also proceeding by way of videoconference.

 $$\operatorname{Ms.}$ Morton, I just want to confirm that you can see me and that you can hear me.

THE DEFENDANT: I can see you and I can hear you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

If at any point you would like to speak privately with your attorneys, you should know that you're free to do so.

We'll take a break, you'll speak privately and then we'll resume the proceedings. Do you understand?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Heller, could you please describe the process by which you discussed with Ms. Morton her right to be present and a knowing and voluntary waiver of that right.

MS. HELLER: Your Honor, we discussed, of course, the right of every defendant to be present at their sentencing proceeding. We also discussed your Honor's opinion in which your Honor stated that the sentencing would proceed on November 18, and we discussed the COVID pandemic and the implications for appearing that day in person. And given all those factors, Ms. Morton and I decided that it was best to appear by video for this proceeding.

THE COURT: All right.

Is that an accurate description of what occurred, Ms. Morton?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, it is, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And do you understand that you have a right to have this sentencing in person in court? Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: I do. I do understand that, your Honor.

THE COURT: And are you choosing to give up that right and to proceed with the sentencing by way of videoconference today?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I am giving up that right in light of the COVID pandemic.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

Is there anything else the government thinks I need to do before I make a finding as to waiver of physical presence?

MS. MERMELSTEIN: Your Honor, I think it's fair that
Ms. Morton has knowingly waived her right, but I think under
the CARES Act and the necessary finding that the sentencing
cannot be further delayed without serious harm to the interest
of justice it's worth noting for the record that in this
particular case I think the interest of justice would be harmed
by further delay both because the unusual length of proceedings
here — this case has been now pending for about four years —
and the large restitution order that is anticipated going to be

entered into -- victims, we just think there's a basis now to go forward.

THE COURT: I intended to mention that. You've done it for me, but I agree.

First, I'll note that I find that a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to be physically present for this sentencing has been made, and I also find that today's proceeding cannot be further delayed without serious harm to the interest of justice. This sentencing has already been put off for over two years, and for the other reasons, including restitution that Ms. Mermelstein noted, I believe it's critical to move forward with the sentencing today.

Is there anyone, Ms. Heller, who's on the line -- any family members or friends -- that I would know were in court if we were physically in court that are on the line that I should know are listening in?

MS. HELLER: No, your Honor. Just other members of the Cahill team of attorneys who worked on the matter.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

By way of background, Ms. Morton pled guilty in May of 2018 to Counts One and Four of the indictment. She's since twice moved to withdraw her plea. Those motions were denied, and we're proceeding with sentencing today.

Before we proceed further, I also want to note that on October 30, I issued an order pursuant to Federal Rule of

Criminal Procedure 5(f) to confirm the government's disclosure obligations under $Brady\ v.\ Maryland$ and its progeny and to summarize the possible consequences of violating those proceedings.

Ms. Mermelstein, I'm just going to ask you, has the government complied with and will it continue to comply with its disclosure obligations?

MS. MERMELSTEIN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Why don't we proceed now to the substance of the proceeding.

In connection with today's proceeding, I have reviewed the following submissions:

The presentence investigation report, which was revised as of November 20, 2018;

Ms. Morton's sentencing memorandum, dated November 16, 2018;

Supplemental sentencing submissions — actually, two supplemental sentencing submissions, dated November 3, 2020, and then an additional submission on November 9, 2020; and the government's sentencing memorandum, dated November 23, 2018, and supplemental submission, dated November 9, 2020.

Have the parties received each of these submissions, and am I missing anything?

MS. MERMELSTEIN: We have received them, your Honor, and you're not missing anything.

MS. HELLER: Your Honor, we have as well. The only other submission I would note would be our separate letter, dated November 3, which is relevant to a few additional corrections and objections to the PSR.

THE COURT: Right. When I noted that you had two supplemental submissions dated November 3, one of them included the letter that addressed your objections to the PSR. So there are two letters from November 3, but not a third. Is that correct?

MS. HELLER: That's correct. The third -- the third submission was November 9.

THE COURT: November 9. OK. So we're all on the same page. Thank you.

Why don't we begin by discussing the presentence report that was prepared by the probation department.

Ms. Heller, we'll get to your objections in a moment, but first let me ask you, have you reviewed the presentence report and discussed it with Ms. Morton?

MS. HELLER: Yes, we have in detail, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Morton, have you reviewed the presentence report and discussed it with your attorneys?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I have, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Ms. Heller, I know you have various objections and there were some objections made by the prior attorneys as well.

Why don't we go through which ones you want to pursue further, and then we'll hear the government out on those objections.

MS. HELLER: Sure.

Your Honor, in our letter of November 3, everything on pages 1, 2 and 3 -- they're listed in bullets -- are all really minor. I would call them corrections. They're not objections. They're factual. You know, we didn't -- the government didn't take a position on those, but I don't think we need to spend time in this proceeding going through them one by one unless the government wants to.

We did a split through paragraph by paragraph and corrected some things that either needed to be updated or we believed were factually incorrect.

THE COURT: Let me just stop you there.

MS. HELLER: That's the bulk of them.

THE COURT: I think if there are items, if there's language that we're adding to the presentence report, I want to hear the government out.

Ms. Mermelstein, why don't you tell me -- you have the November 3 letter -- do you have objections to the language being added in paragraph 9?

MS. MERMELSTEIN: Your Honor, I'm just going to pull up the letter.

We don't generally have any objections to the, as Nola characterizes them, sort of minor updates and corrections --

that is to say, information about Ms. Morton's personal and familial relationships, her financial situation, updates with respect to the fact that since the time this was prepared additional defendants have been sentenced.

And I think with respect to the last paragraph about Ms. Morton's intent and challenges to the factual recitation on the basis that they were proven at a trial that Ms. Morton was not a participant in, there we do have objections. Obviously, Ms. Morton pled guilty and admitted that she intended to commit the fraud, and we would not be here if she had not intended to do so, so the language with respect to intent clearly properly belongs in the PSR.

With respect to the suggestion that evidence adduced at trial doesn't belong in the PSR, I think if Ms. Morton has specific challenges to evidence that she wants to raise, she can pursue them, but the mere fact that there's a citation to the fact that it was put forth at trial is no reason that it can't be included simply because she was not a trial defendant. So there, too, we think that the language and the facts are a problem.

THE COURT: All right. As an initial matter, what I'm going to do is I'm going to make all the corrections from paragraph 9 to paragraph 142.

I'm not going to include the footnotes, Ms. Heller, unless you're asking me to do so. Just clarify that for me,

please.

MS. HELLER: Oh, no, your Honor. Those were intended as (indecipherable).

THE COURT: And with respect to the updates regarding the additional, the other defendants, the codefendants, I can either leave it to the two of you to submit language. I can leave it to the probation department. I mean there shouldn't be dispute about that. With respect to language, why don't you do that. Why don't you speak among yourselves and just submit a letter to me or just give it directly to the probation department.

Ms. Mermelstein, do you have a preference on that?

MS. MERMELSTEIN: Your Honor, whatever you prefer. If

it's easier for your Honor not to have to (indecipherable),

we're happy to work on it with probation. I don't think

there'll be any dispute.

THE COURT: OK. Why don't you do that.

Now, with respect to what was proven at the trial, I think the government is right, and I think it's, of course, clear from the presentence report that Ms. Morton was not at trial. If there is particular evidence that you seek to challenge, Ms. Heller, let me know that specifically. I'll just add if there's additional language you want me to add, like Ms. Morton's now contesting blank, I can add that in. I think the language should stay as is, but I'm also happy to add

in language expressing Ms. Morton's current position if you would like me to do that.

MS. HELLER: Right. Your Honor, I think what we would contemplate for both this and the intent language was just simply a sentence, perhaps, to this effect: Ms. Morton was not a defendant at the trial and thus did not have an opportunity to challenge the evidence that was presented. And for intent, similarly, perhaps a sentence that would say Ms. Morton, in her two motions to withdraw her guilty plea, alleged that she did not have intent to commit the charged crimes, just simple factual recitation.

THE COURT: OK. I'm going to do that. I'm going to add in language in paragraphs — I don't know if I'll put it in all of them; there's 60 to 63 — to the effect that Ms. Morton notes that she was not a defendant at trial, so I'm making it clear that this is something she wants to say here, and did not have the opportunity to challenge the evidence or the witnesses presented. And then I will add —

Go ahead.

MS. HELLER: I was just saying my video has frozen. I can hear you perfectly. I just wanted to note that, and I don't know whether I should -- maybe we'll all just wait, but I may want to log back on if it continues.

THE COURT: That's fine. Do you want to do that right now? Do you want to take a one-minute break and log out and

log back in?

on audio.

MS. HELLER: Yeah. I apologize. Perhaps that's best. I'll do that very quickly and be right back on, but I'm still

THE COURT: OK.

MS. HELLER: Because I'm on the audio through conference.

THE COURT: OK.

MS. HELLER: I think, actually, your Honor's fine if you keep talking.

THE COURT: All right. I'll do that.

MS. HELLER: I can hear you.

THE COURT: That's what I'm going to do. I'm going to just add in one line saying that Ms. Morton, in her motions to withdraw her plea, is now contesting that she had the requisite intent, but I'll also add in that those motions to withdraw her plea were denied. I can't recall if that's -- that's obviously -- I take that back. That wouldn't be in this report.

MS. HELLER: That's right.

THE COURT: Was the first one in here? Let me look back.

I'll look later, but in any event, I will note that she's made two motions to withdraw her plea and that both of those motions have been denied by the Court.

All right.

MS. HELLER: I'm now back on video.

MS. MERMELSTEIN: (indecipherable) PSR because the first PSR contemplates the loss of acceptance points on the basis of the effort to withdraw.

THE COURT: You're absolutely right. You're absolutely right. You're absolutely right.

I'll just add in that there were, in fact, two motions. She's now contesting that she had the requisite intent, but I'll note somewhere in there that those two motions have been denied.

If you all want to see where I put it before this is released, you have the opportunity to do so, Ms. Heller.

Are you also persisting in some of the prior objections, Ms. Heller, that were raised by prior counsel, including that she is, in fact, entitled to acceptance points?

MS. HELLER: No, your Honor. We're not persisting in the fact that -- we do not contest that Ms. Morton is entitled to acceptance points, and I believe all of the prior objections have been noted and -- within the third addendum, third disclosure, so although we certainly don't withdraw any of those objections, I don't think any of them need to be addressed.

THE COURT: OK. All right.

With that said, does the government have any

objections to the presentence report?

MS. MERMELSTEIN: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK.

The Court adopts the factual findings in the report with the modifications already noted, most of which were agreed to. The presentence report will be made part of the record in this matter and placed under seal. If an appeal is taken, counsel on appeal may have access to the sealed report without further application to the Court.

Ms. Morton, when you pled guilty in May 2018, I'm sure you remember we discussed the federal sentencing guidelines, and they've been raised a number of times in various proceedings since then. I'll just note for the record they are recommendations to the Court. At one point they were mandatory, meaning judges were required to follow them, but they're no longer binding on judges. But judges must nonetheless consider them in determining an appropriate sentence and must ensure that they have properly computed the guidelines range.

Based on the presentence report as well as my independent evaluation of the guidelines, I find that Ms. Morton's offense level is 35. Her criminal history category is I and her recommended guidelines sentence is 120 months because that's the statutory max, Which is now the guidelines range.

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1 Is there any dispute about that? 2 MS. MERMELSTEIN: No, your Honor. 3 MS. HELLER: No, your Honor, there's not. 4 THE COURT: All right. As I said a moment ago, the 5 range is only advisory. Courts may impose a sentence outside 6 of that range based on one of two legal concepts: a departure 7 or a variance. A departure allows for a sentence outside of the advisory range based on some provision in the guidelines 8 9 themselves. Neither side, as I understand it, is seeking a 10 departure, but I understand that Ms. Morton is seeking a 11 variance. 12 Is that correct, Ms. Heller? 13 MS. HELLER: That's correct, your Honor. 14 THE COURT: All right. With that, I'll hear from the 15 parties. Would the government like to be heard --16 MS. MERMELSTEIN: Yes. 17 THE COURT: -- or would any victims like to be heard? MS. MERMELSTEIN: Your Honor, no victims intend to be 18 heard. 19 20 And I'll be brief, your Honor. Your Honor's obviously 21 very familiar at this point with the facts of this case, but 22 the evidence here with respect to Ms. Morton is very clear: 23 That she assumed a fiduciary role with respect to pension fund 24 clients of both Atlantic and Hughes and she completely

abdicated that responsibility, having agreed even before the

purchase of those entities, that tens of millions of dollars of worthless bonds would be put into the client accounts and indeed the clients lost the entirety of those investments.

She did that not once, but twice. She did it despite protests of some of the employees, longstanding employees, of the investment advisers, and after the first set of bonds was discovered by the clients, they fired the investment adviser. They demanded the bonds be sold, and everyone involved was very aware that the bonds could not be sold because no one wanted them. And nonetheless, Ms. Morton went forward, doing exactly the same thing a second time, with full knowledge of how clients were reacting and the fact that they had no market and could not be resold. And those are pension funds that have lost that money and will not recoup it. There is no expectation here that restitution or forfeiture will ever be paid to these people in full.

Ms. Morton has also, uniquely perhaps, wholly failed to accept any responsibility for her conduct here. She has along the way blamed the government, blamed other members of the conspiracy, blamed at times her own lawyers, and will not, continues to fail to acknowledge her role in this offense, and I think that that is a very serious consideration at sentencing.

As we've laid out in our sentencing submission, and I won't belabor it, there's no question that COVID is something

that has to be considered here, but the remedy surely cannot be a free pass for Ms. Morton, and given that she is not yet incarcerated, there's really -- your Honor does not face the challenge of a binary choice that we face in the compassionate release setting, in which the choice is simply to let someone out or have them serve the entirety of their sentence and there is no middle ground. There is very much a middle ground here, and the government does not object to a surrender date that's set many months from now, and which can be revisited, but feels very strongly that your Honor should impose the sentence that would be imposed in the absence of COVID and account for COVID simply by delaying surrender.

I think a very serious incarceratory sentence is appropriate here to punish the conduct, and as a result, we think the guidelines are not an unreasonable sentence in this case.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. I mean you're asking for a ten-year sentence. Of the people that have already been sentenced, the only person who got more than that is Jason Galanis, and only half of that was run consecutively in the initial sentence. It's since been changed by Judge Castel in light of the reversal in the Gerova case, but only half of that was to run consecutively.

Gary Hirst got a 96-month sentence, but only 36 months -- three years -- were to run consecutively, and he had

prior criminal dealings with the Galanis brothers.

John Galanis got a 120-month sentence, and only four of those years were to run consecutively.

Gary Hirst is already on home detention.

Why would it not lead to unwarranted sentencing disparities to give Ms. Morton a sentence of 120 months or anything close to that?

MS. MERMELSTEIN: Your Honor, I think that's fair. I would say the government has asked for a guidelines sentence for each of these defendants, and in keeping with that, I don't think one would be unreasonable separate and apart from the other sentences received.

Putting Ms. Morton in the context of the other defendants, it's complicated with respect to the defendants who are serving two sentences because how you accommodate those two things together is a little bit nuanced. But I would note with respect to how to situate her that at Mr. Cooney's sentencing your Honor asked if he should receive a minor role and whether or not there were any participants in the scheme who were less culpable than him, and the government's view, answer to your Honor was that there were no participants in the scheme less culpable than Mr. Cooney.

Mr. Cooney obviously had a serious role in the offense, but he received 30 months. He did not have any fiduciary duty to the people whose money he stole, and as the

government said at his sentencing, there were no defendants it viewed as being less culpable than him. So I take your Honor's point that while guidelines sentences in the government's view were appropriate across the board here, in light of the sentences imposed, 120 months might be disproportionate. I think nonetheless when you situate Ms. Morton you have to see her as being between Mr. Cooney and Mr. Hirst; Mr. Hirst being, of course, the only other defendant in the scheme who was directly employed at and involved in the fiduciary assets of the scheme and who also was (indecipherable) a fiduciary duty, and so I would put her between Mr. Cooney and Mr. Hirst in that respect.

THE COURT: I can talk more about how I look at her as different from Mr. Hirst, but with respect to Cooney, I think that there was more evidence that he was aware of this broader fraud. And as you know, when Ms. Morton pled guilty, she acknowledged that her conduct enabled Jason Galanis to steal the bond proceeds through the broader fraud that led her investors to lose money, but she specifically disclaimed any knowledge of that broader fraud, and the government was comfortable with that allocution at the time.

All right. In any event, I think I've made my point and I've heard you out, so thank you.

MS. MERMELSTEIN: If I could say one thing, your Honor?

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THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead. 1 MS. MERMELSTEIN: I do think Ms. Morton's allocution 2 3 was unquestionably legally sufficient, but that doesn't mean 4 the government agreed with the narrow way in which she pled. 5 THE COURT: I'm fully aware of that fact, and I think 6 you've made your point very clear in your submissions, relying, 7 among other things, on trial testimony. So I think that's clear. I just wanted to note that for the record when we're 8 9 speaking about relative culpability. 10 Ms. Heller, would you like to be heard? 11 MS. HELLER: I would, your Honor. Thank you very 12 much. 13 And before I begin, I already discussed this with your 14 Honor's deputy, but with the Court's permission, Samantha 15 Lawson, who has filed a notice of appearance and is an associate on the matter, would be speaking just for a minute on 16 17 one discrete issue in the middle of my presentation? THE COURT: Yes, of course. 18 MS. HELLER: OK. 19 20 Welcome. 21 MS. LAWSON: Thank you. 22 MS. HELLER: And Ms. Lawson is on video. I can't see 23 her on my screen, but I assume she will pop up. 24 THE COURT: Yes, I can see her.

OK.

MS. HELLER:

Your Honor, thank you. Thank you for the time today.

I want to spend a little bit of time talking about the Michelle Morton that I've come to know over the past two years. Michelle has lived a fascinating life, from being elected president of her junior and senior year classes, one of the few Black girls in her school, to working her way up the financial industry ladder and eventually owning her own firm, Pacific American Securities, to being asked to serve on the board of directors of her alma mater, Hood College, Michelle is a person who cares deeply. She cares deeply about the causes she believes in and for the people she loves.

As Ms. Lawson will discuss further, she's a devoted daughter, spending her days and nights caring for her elderly parents and assuring that their needs are taken care of. She believes in the advancement of those less fortunate, especially people of color. At Pacific American she made it a point to employ women of color to help employ them — to help empower them. Excuse me. Long before she ever met her codefendants in this case, she took an interest in Native-American causes, attending NAFOA conferences. And NAFOA is the Native-American Finance Officers Association. She networked with those engaged in Native-American investment opportunities. She was building her expertise to financially advise Native-American tribes.

Michelle is also someone that I've come to know has a firm sense of right and wrong. That's a sense that led her to

stand up to CALSTRS when they asked her to take a financial position that she thought was illegal when she was at Pacific American, and that's described in detail in prior counsel's submission. That's the same sense that led her to call FInRA and later begin working with the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's Office, when she suspected that Jason Galanis and his crew were committing fraud, to engage in conduct that she thought was very personally dangerous, recording phone calls with and meetings with Jason Galanis.

Michelle is someone who's suffered greatly also in her life. She was brutally and violently raped in high school, a trauma that led to a pregnancy and a late-term abortion that has scarred her forever. She was never able to conceive a child after that incident. Michelle has also endured the suicide of her ex-husband Tom, a man who she loved deeply but who was troubled beyond her ability to help him. Michelle also suffers greatly from medical conditions that plague her, including most seriously her lupus nephritis, which has led to chronic kidney disease. Her hypertension also poses significant difficulty for her, often leading to dizziness, headaches, incapacitation during spikes, and we've provided hundreds of pages of medical records to document those conditions in addition to a letter from a physician.

Beyond all of this, all of these things and these experiences that Michelle has had, I've come to know that she's

smart, funny; she's caring. She's passionate. She's a remarkable person, who's lived an extraordinary life and succeeded in the face of incredible challenges, up until she met Jason Galanis, when it all turned upside down. We submit that Michelle's history and characteristics, which I just recounted and are described at length in prior counsel's submission, as well as the lack of a need for any specific deterrence, which I'll address shortly (indecipherable), particularly in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. But now I would like to address the pandemic and the government's arguments, because the pandemic is necessarily front and center of this proceeding, obviously, as we appear here.

THE COURT: And while you do that, Ms. Heller, I'll tell you I am inclined to take the government's suggestion and to put off her surrender date until a time at which the pandemic is under control in the federal facilities, so just keep that in mind when you're making your argument, please.

MS. HELLER: That's helpful, your Honor.

As we all know, as we're appearing right now, we are in the midst of the worst period of the pandemic so far nationwide, and as your Honor has just said and as the government has also conceded, to surrender right now could effectively be a death sentence for Michelle, a certainly grave, grave danger for her, and so we appreciate that both your Honor and the government don't feel that any surrender

currently would be necessary. But what we submit is what we've previewed in our very brief submission of November 9, that this alternative solution, the postponement of a sentence until some unknown time in the future is also not particularly realistic.

We don't know at this point when COVID-19 will have receded to the point that a prison could be a safer place for Michelle. Of course, since we actually made our submissions we've now received promising news of potential vaccines, but it's totally unclear when the general public will begin being able to receive the vaccine. Prison populations are likely to be among the last groups to receive those doses. Prisons will have to make special modifications to store the vaccine, which, as we know, the Pfizer vaccine has to be stored at exceptionally low temperatures and under -- and both vaccines, I believe, under very specific conditions.

Perhaps even more critically, the effect of vaccine on lupus patients almost certainly has not yet been studied, so it's unclear whether Michelle will ever be able to take a vaccine. As we sit here today, whether she would be able to do that, I think, is entirely in question. And all of that aside, as we've argued and as prior counsel argued before, prison was an exceptionally dangerous prospect for Michelle even before COVID-19 due to the devastating effect that stress can have on her lupus nephritis and hypertension, among other factors.

We saw what happened on the day of the original

sentencing in this case and we've now seen the medical records that document that she went into hypertensive crisis, and I, frankly, shudder to think about what might happen if Michelle is put in the extraordinarily stressful situation of being put in prison on a day-to-day basis and how that would affect her hypertension, her lupus and all of the serious conditions that she ignored, COVID aside. So we recognize that varying downward from 120 months to a noncustodial sentence would be extraordinary, but we respectfully submit these are extraordinary times, as your Honor has noted and many other courts have noted, and that even aside from those extraordinary times, the documented medical conditions require, what we submit, they require that any safe sentence for Michelle would not include incarceration.

If your Honor has any questions on that, I'm at peace.

I'm happy (indecipherable) further.

THE COURT: No. Thank you.

MS. HELLER: OK.

And now, with the Court's permission, Ms. Lawson will speak for a few moments.

MS. LAWSON: Thank you, Ms. Heller.

And good morning, your Honor.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. LAWSON: As Ms. Heller has explained, any term of prison would be catastrophic for Michelle even prior to COVID,

but her incarceration would also have a disastrous impact on her 82-year-old mother and her 86-year-old father. Michelle lives with her parents and (indecipherable) herself with their care and well-being.

Michelle's mother Beatrice, called Betty, and her father Ronald depend solely on Michelle to run their home, ensure they have food to eat and help them remain healthy. To that end, Michelle cleans the house. She does the family laundry, stocks the kitchen with food and provides meals, pays the household bills and runs errands outside the home for her parents. As Michelle's parents have gotten older, she has stepped in to help them (indecipherable) own medical conditions. She reminds them to take their daily medications and she refills prescriptions when they need it.

Michelle goes above and beyond every day to ensure her parents feel supported as they enter (indecipherable) stage of their lives, helping her father shave, something he can't do anymore, and checking on her sleeping parents throughout the night. Michelle's parents are entirely dependent on her for their basic needs and survival. With Michelle by their sides, they lead happy, healthy and stable lives. Without Michelle to care for them, they will struggle to prepare meals, take life-sustaining medication and maintain their hygiene.

As we previewed, it was true before COVID and it's even more pronounced now. Due to their ages and health

conditions, Betty and Ronald are at high risk for complications if they contract COVID, so they can't go to the grocery store (indecipherable). They can't do pharmacy runs. They can't do errand runs. They rely on Michelle more than ever now, and the government is simply wrong that Michelle's brother can take care of their parents in her absence.

Michelle's younger brother and his wife, who temporarily live with her parents, are planning to move out of the family home in short order; they're already house hunting, and they are on their way to a permanent move. But more pressing is that Michelle's younger brother and his wife have a nearly 13-year-old son with autism, who is completely dependent on them for care. Michelle's nephew is largely nonverbal and does not keep a normal schedule (indecipherable) at 2 a.m. sometimes. He is incontinent and not able to use the toilet, something that must be dealt with day and night by his parents. As he grows, Michelle's nephew has become more physical and at times more aggressive while being cared for. He cannot be left unsupervised for really any amount of time, because in the past he has walked out of the house. He's gone down the street.

Michelle's brother and sister-in-law both have work responsibilities as well, and they arrange their schedules so that one of them is always with their son while the other works, and then they switch. They simply cannot provide care for two additional people, let alone the same quality of care,

should Michelle be incarcerated.

Finally, Michelle's older brother does not live in New Jersey, and so he is not able to step in either. He travels constantly for work, and his home base of late has been Houston, Texas, and Minnesota. Michelle actually just got word that he will be relocating to Massachusetts shortly. Contrary to the government's assertion, this does, in fact, render him completely unavailable (indecipherable). Put simply, Michelle is critical to her parents' survival and remaining in their home is critical to hers. By not sending Michelle to prison it's not an understatement to say (indecipherable) three people's lives and not just one.

MS. HELLER: Your Honor, for purposes of -- (indecipherable).

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I didn't hear the last comment. The audio went out for a moment.

MS. HELLER: Yeah. Was it my comment or Ms. Lawson's comment?

THE COURT: No. I think I heard the end of Ms. Lawson. Ms. Heller, I think it was you. Were you saying something about the court reporter?

MS. HELLER: Yes. I was just saying it's Ms. Heller now for the court reporter.

THE COURT: Oh, OK. All right. Understood.

MS. HELLER: Yeah.

THE COURT: Sorry.

MS. HELLER: OK.

THE COURT: Please (indecipherable).

MS. HELLER: Your Honor, I want to finish our presentation by just returning to the 3553(a) factors, specifically focusing on disparity, deterrence, a just punishment and the need to protect the public.

In response to the sentencing disparity issue, the Court has already hit the nail on the head with respect to the other defendants, and I don't think I need to further dwell on that other than to say that we certainly don't feel that Michelle ranks anywhere that highly on the culpability scale. But we also want to note, what we emphasized in our submission, is that we view Michelle as simply in a different category than her codefendants.

She did not benefit financially from the crimes of conviction, unlike many of her codefendants, who spent the investors' money on their own lavish lifestyles. Michelle, on the other hand, is so destitute she cannot even afford the medical care that she desperately needs. And Jason Galanis used her. Jason Galanis and Hugh Dunkerley viewed her as a scapegoat, someone they could blame for their actions. She was an easy and convenient mark for them because she was not part of their crew.

Also, none of her codefendants that we're aware of had

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family or medical situations anywhere of a similar severity to hers, and as the Court knows, those issues were going to be significant even at the initial sentencing proceeding. And the stakes are infinitely higher now.

Now, as far as the need for just punishment and deterrence, this case has wreaked other destruction on Michelle's life. Her once flourishing career in the financial industry, which she worked her whole life to achieve, is over She knows that. Thus, the Court has no reason to be concerned that she's going to recidivate. Michelle is sick with a variety of medical conditions she cannot pay to treat, as I mentioned. She's lost her friends, her colleagues, her personal and professional support system. Her indictment and conviction, we respectfully submit, are punishment enough. Any member of the general public who were to see what Michelle's life has become would agree that she's suffered greatly already by virtue of her conviction and will continue to suffer for the rest of her life. And neither the government nor the guidelines suggest that a sentence of death or life imprisonment should be imposed here. But that's what a custodial sentence might well be for Michelle, COVID aside.

Michelle is a strong woman. I've come to know she's an exceptionally strong woman, someone who I know can survive almost anything, but she might well not survive a term of incarceration in this case. So for that reason and for the

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many others argued in our submission, we respectfully submit that a sentence of home confinement would be fair and appropriate in this case.

Your Honor, unless you have any questions, that completes our oral presentation.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Ms. Morton, is there anything you'd like to say today?

THE DEFENDANT: No. Your Honor.

THE COURT: OK.

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Is there any reason why sentence cannot be imposed at this time?

MS. MERMELSTEIN: No, your Honor.

MS. HELLER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm required to consider the advisory guidelines range of 120 months as well as various other factors that are outlined in a provision of the law that's 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a), and I've done so.

Those factors include, but are not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, because each defendant must be considered individually as a person. Judges are also required to consider the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the

law, provide just punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, protect the public from further crimes of the defendant and avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, among other things.

Look, as I've said a number of times previously with respect to this case, there's no real dispute about the seriousness of the crime and the harm that it caused real people, the harm that it caused to one of the poorest

Native-American tribes in the country as well as the clients of Hughes and Atlantic, pension funds held for the benefit of transit workers, longshoremen, housing authority workers and city employees, among others.

Given her admission at her plea, there's also or should be no dispute that Ms. Morton breached her fiduciary duty to the Hughes Atlantic clients when she agreed to purchase the WLCC bonds into their accounts in violation of investment parameters of those accounts and after failing to disclose material conflicts of interest in the transaction. I'm especially troubled that even after the negative reaction of the Hughes employees and clients following that purchase of WLCC bonds she engaged in the same conduct at Atlantic.

Together with Jason Galanis and others, she used another pension-fund client's money to purchase more than \$16 million of another round of WLCC bonds despite the material conflicts and violations of investment policies and agreements. And

Ms. Morton's role was essential to the success of this scheme.

All that said, I do view Ms. Morton's role as distinguishable from that of many of her coconspirators, as I alluded to earlier. Critically, from my perspective, there's no direct evidence that she knew that the WLCC had been fraudulently induced to issue the bonds or that the bond proceeds were stolen. Indeed, while she acknowledged during her plea allocution that her conduct enabled Jason Galanis to steal the bond proceeds through a broader fraud that led her investors to lose money, she disclaimed any knowledge of that broader fraud, and in that respect, it makes the guideline that is driven by the loss amount significantly less useful here.

Ms. Morton also didn't receive any of the bond proceeds herself, unlike her codefendants, who, other than Archer, received anywhere from thousands to millions of dollars for their involvement in the scheme.

Just to be clear, I don't mean in any way to minimize or excuse her conduct. She knew that she was committing investment adviser fraud and played a critical role in the scheme that led her investors to suffer tremendous losses, but her conduct is distinguishable, in my view.

I also think she deserves some credit for her attempts to cooperate, including her agreement to wear a wire during two meetings with, and to record numerous telephone calls with,

Jason Galanis and for providing information to law enforcement,

including the contents of her cell phone. That credit should be somewhat limited for the reasons noted by the government: that her efforts to raise concerns with FInRA about Jason Galanis appeared to have been part of an effort to save herself after receiving document requests; and that she agreed to assist the FBI and prosecutors only after she was approached by the FBI.

That said, most cooperating witnesses only cooperate after their conduct has been uncovered.

As for her remorse, or lack thereof, I agree that by attempting to withdraw her guilty plea twice at least made a wonder if she truly were remorseful and willing to accept responsibilities for her actions. At this point I think it's clear she's not willing to accept responsibility for her actions, although she may well be remorseful that people were harmed in the way that they were.

I have also considered Ms. Morton's age; her substantial medical issues, both physical and mental; the traumatic events that she's experienced; and that she is a caretaker for her elderly parents; and that, by all accounts, she lived a hardworking and law-abiding life prior to developing a relationship with Jason Galanis.

Finally, I've considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and as I noted earlier, I do think giving her the guidelines sentence the government's requesting

would lead directly to unwarranted sentencing disparities.

I've already noted above how I view her and her conduct as distinguishable in certain ways from some of her codefendants. Unlike Ms. Morton, for example, Gary Hirst, who pled guilty to four counts involving securities fraud and investment adviser fraud, had previously engaged in a different fraud with John and Jason Galanis and received \$1.3 million in proceeds for his conduct. And as I noted earlier, while I imposed a sentence of 96 months in Mr. Hirst's case, only 36 of those were imposed consecutive to the sentence that he got in the Gerova fraud, the prior fraud case with John and Jason Galanis, and that he was released to home confinement, I think, approximately a year and a half after the sentence. And those are all, I think, relevant factors for me to consider. Unlike Mr. Hirst, for example, Ms. Morton has no criminal history whatsoever.

For all those reasons, I think in the light of the seriousness of the conduct, an incarceratory sentence is necessary here. I think I would be sending the wrong message to the many victims in this case not to impose an incarceratory sentence, but I don't think that it needs to be close to the number that the government's requesting and that the guidelines recommend.

Ms. Morton, it's the judgment of this Court that you be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term

of 15 months on Counts One and Four to run concurrent to one another. That term of imprisonment shall also be followed by a term of supervised release of three years on each count, also to run concurrent.

In light of all of the various reasons I noted, I do believe this sentence is sufficient but not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing set forth in the law. And while it may seem like and is a significant reduction from the sentence that the guidelines recommend, I just want to pause for a minute and have everyone think about what it will mean to Ms. Morton, who's now 60 years old and has never engaged in any prior criminal conduct, to spend over a year of her life incarcerated.

What I'm going to do now is describe the conditions of supervised release. We'll talk about restitution and forfeiture.

Are there any objections to the terms of supervised release that were recommended by the probation department?

MS. HELLER: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Ms. Heller, do you want me to read out loud the standard conditions, or do you waive the public reading, since you reviewed the presentence report with Ms. Morton?

MS. HELLER: We waive that reading, and we went over it and we can go over it again.

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THE COURT: All right. All of the standard conditions shall apply. In addition, the mandatory conditions shall apply. Ms. Morton, you must not commit another federal, state or local crime. You must not unlawfully possess a controlled substance. You must refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled substance. You must submit to one drug test within 15 days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug tests thereafter. The probation department, I see, actually recommends suspending the drug-testing condition. Is there any objection, actually, upon reflection, to suspending that condition? MS. MERMELSTEIN: No, your Honor. MS. HELLER: No. THE COURT: All right. That will be suspended due to Ms. Morton's low risk of future substance abuse and the recommendation of the probation department. Ms. Morton shall also cooperate in the collection of DNA, as directed by the probation officer.

In addition, in light of the nature of the crime here

and the financial penalties that will be imposed, I'm going to

adopt the special conditions recommended by the probation department:

One, Ms. Morton shall provide the probation officer with access to any requested financial information. She shall not incur new credit card charges or open additional lines of credit without the approval of the probation officer unless she is in compliance with the installment payment schedule.

And in light of her mental health history, she shall participate in an outpatient mental health treatment program approved by the probation office. She must continue to take any prescribed medications unless otherwise instructed by the healthcare provider. She must contribute to the cost of services rendered based on her ability to pay and the availability of third-party payment.

The Court authorizes the release of available psychological and psychiatric evaluations and reports, including the presentence investigation report, to the healthcare provider.

All right. I decline to impose a fine in light of the forfeiture and restitution orders that will follow and in light of Ms. Morton's financial condition.

I am imposing the mandatory special assessment of \$200, which shall be paid immediately.

Ms. Heller, do you have any objection to the order of restitution that the government sent last night, which had been

sent previously; but the version that we were sent last night, do you have any objection to that?

MS. HELLER: No. No objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Consistent with the order of restitution, the defendant shall pay \$43,785,176 in restitution to the victims of the offenses charged in Counts One and Four. Her liability is joint and several with that of the other defendants'. The names, addresses and specific amounts owed to each victim are outlined on the schedule of victims. The victim page will be filed under seal, but that will be on the docket later today. I will sign that.

With respect to forfeiture, my understanding is that the government is requesting forfeiture in the amount of the \$9,086,016 representing the funds Ms. Morton received from GMT Duncan to purchase Atlantic and Hughes in addition to the \$305,000 that she received to cover Atlantic expenses after purchasing WLCC bonds into an Atlantic account. Is that correct?

MS. MERMELSTEIN: Your Honor, I apologize. I think there's actually an update to that. At the time we filed that number, there was some lack of clarity with respect to Honeycutt that I think has since been clarified in Bergstein, 788 F.App'x 742. I actually think in light of that, because Ms. Morton was the CEO of both Atlantic and Hughes and directed

that the proceeds, that the client funds be used to purchase the bonds, that the entirety of the bond purchase amount is forfeitable from her; that is to say, the same number as restitution.

I think it's academic in this case, and the government is happy to stand by the number included in its original submission, but I note that because I actually think, upon reflection, that the amount used to purchase the first investment adviser, which was not itself derived from the fraud, is arguably not a proper way to think about forfeiture here; that the better way to think about it is in terms of the money misappropriated from clients to purchase the bonds without disclosure of the conflicts and with the knowledge that the bonds were problematic.

I don't know if Ms. Heller has a view. There was no discussion of forfeiture in the defense submission, but I wanted to make that record because I think the more accurate way to think about the forfeiture is to think about it as the same as restitution.

THE COURT: Ms. Heller, do you want to be heard with respect to forfeiture? And I do believe given the numbers that we're talking about that it is academic, but that being said, I want to order the proper amount under the law.

MS. HELLER: Your Honor, as Ms. Mermelstein said, this issue wasn't briefed, and so I don't think I can take a

position right now based on what Ms. Mermelstein is saying.

However, I do think it's academic, and so I think we'd be fine
deferring to whatever decision your Honor chooses to make.

THE COURT: OK. All right. Again, I think it's academic too, but I think -- you know what? I think in light of the fact that the lower numbers, the nine-plus million and \$305,000, were what Ms. Morton was notified about prior to this proceeding, I'm inclined to stick with that number. Again -- I see Ms. Mermelstein nodding; it seems like you don't have an objection to that -- again, in light of the restitution figure. So I'm going to order forfeiture in that amount. All right?

Ms. Heller, I take it you don't have an objection to that because you were aware of that figure in the past and aren't objecting today. Is that correct?

MS. HELLER: That's correct. And just to be clear for our client, what I mean by academic is that it's very clear, I think, to everyone here that Ms. Morton lacks — completely lacks — the funds to pay either the restitution or the forfeiture, and so though we understand that these items may be legally required, but it's academic because everyone understands she does not, at least currently, have the ability to pay these sums.

THE COURT: All right. In any event, I'm sticking with the lower numbers, and I think there's a very clear basis for them in light of the evidence, among other things, that was

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introduced at trial.

With respect to the restitution amount, do you have an objection to what was recommended on page 42 of the presentence report with respect to payments?

MS. HELLER: Let me just get to page 42, your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah. Go ahead.

MS. HELLER: No objection, your Honor.

THE COURT: OK. I'm not going to read it out loud given that there's no objection, but I'm going to incorporate that into my judgment.

That's the sentence I intend to impose.

Does either counsel know of any legal reason why the sentence cannot be imposed as stated?

MS. MERMELSTEIN: No, your Honor.

MS. HELLER: Your Honor, I just had one question. Is it 15 months or 16, one five or one six? I couldn't quite --

THE COURT: One five.

MS. HELLER: OK.

No, your Honor, I don't know of any legal reason.

THE COURT: Ms. Morton, before I read you your appellate rights, I do want to talk about the surrender date. As we noted earlier, I think the government agrees, and I agree as well, that it's appropriate to ensure that the pandemic is under control before you surrender. I'm not going to put off a surrender date forever, but I do want to ensure that you're

safe. What I'm going to do is I'm going to schedule the surrender date for six months from now, for May 18, 2021.

Ms. Heller, you're permitted to submit a letter if the pandemic is not under control in federal facilities by May 18, 2021; you can request that that surrender date be put off.

Again, I don't intend to put that surrender date off forever, but I just want to be clear that that's our date unless I grant an adjournment in advance.

The conditions of your release will continue up until the time that you report to begin your sentence, Ms. Morton, and keep in mind that if you fail to report for your sentence, you could be charged with another criminal offense.

That's the sentence of this Court.

You have a right to appeal your conviction and sentence except to whatever extent you may have validly waived that right as part of your plea agreement. If you do choose to appeal, the notice of appeal must be filed within 14 days of the judgment of conviction. If you're not able to pay for the cost of an appeal, you may apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis, which simply means that court costs, such as filing fees, will be waived. If you request, the clerk of court will prepare and file a notice of appeal on your behalf.

Is the government moving to dismiss the two open counts?

MS. MERMELSTEIN: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. They'll be dismissed.

Ms. Morton, I say this a lot at sentencing, but I really believe it to be true. I don't think you need to be defined by the worst thing you ever did in your life. I don't think you need to be defined by this conduct, but you have to learn from it, and I think you would be better served accepting what you did, as you did previously, coming to peace with it, coming to peace with what I think is a very reasonable sentence in light of how many people were harmed by this conduct and by your conduct. But you don't need to be defined by it. You do a lot of really good things in your life. You care for your parents. You care for your family. There are so many other ways that you can define yourself. I hope that you're able to move forward from this after your sentence in a positive way, and I wish you luck with that.

Are there any other applications at this time?

MS. MERMELSTEIN: No, your Honor.

MS. HELLER: Your Honor, I'm just picking up the phone because there's a bit of background noise so hopefully you can hear me properly.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. HELLER: OK.

I'm not sure if this will -- I'm not sure if
Ms. Morton will choose to file an appeal, but since we're all
together here now, I wanted to raise the potential of bail

pending appeal. Again, I don't know whether the surrender date will actually be May 18 or whether it will be further adjourned and whether — if Ms. Morton does choose to file an appeal what the status of that appeal would be; perhaps it will be resolved by then. But I would raise it, and your Honor knows the standard, but we certainly don't think Ms. Morton is a flight risk or a danger. We think her appeal both, if she were to file it, would potentially present a substantial question of fact given all the year of briefing, a four-day evidentiary hearing, hundreds of exhibits that were reviewed and that potentially there could be an issue that the Court would want to consider.

But that aside, there's another basis if your Honor wanted to consider release under 3145(b) for exceptional circumstances in light of the COVID pandemic. So I don't think we have --

THE COURT: Can I stop you there.

I'm having trouble seeing what the exceptional circumstances would be if I'm not having her surrender until I think that it's safe for her to serve her time.

MS. HELLER: Right. And so that's what I was going to say. We may not have to discuss this issue today, and perhaps, maybe we just simply revisit it depending on whether Ms. Morton appeals and when she is surrendering. Does that make sense?

THE COURT: You're free to make that application at

another time. I'll tell you I wouldn't be inclined to grant it for the same reasons that I denied the motion most recently in terms of the merits of the appeal, but I am happy to consider that at another time.

MS. HELLER: OK. Your Honor, I think it makes sense to revisit, because again there's a lot of questions. I just wanted to raise it now since we were all here together.

THE COURT: That's fine.

MS. HELLER: Yeah. No problem. So if it becomes relevant at any point in the future, we'll simply write your Honor a letter addressing the issue further.

THE COURT: That's fine. I just would advise you not to do it one or two days before the surrender date, but give it time to be fully briefed beforehand so that I can rule.

Ms. Mermelstein, do you want to be heard on that at all?

MS. MERMELSTEIN: I don't, your Honor. I think the government would oppose any such motion. Your Honor has already given Ms. Morton such a delayed surrender date that I can't see why there's a need to then have bail pending appeal.

I would note that Ms. Morton waived her right to appeal a sentence within or below the guidelines, which she has received, so I don't know that she, in fact — that's a question for her lawyers, but I don't actually think she can file an appeal, and so I don't think that there is an issue

here, and we can brief it if she wants to file it. But I think given that the surrender date is six months out, she can file an appeal now if she has a basis. It may well be decided by then, but I don't think there are any substantial legal issues. Your Honor's record is very clear here, and so I don't think there's a close call.

THE COURT: All right.

MS. MERMELSTEIN: But we can take it up if it's filed.

THE COURT: OK. I'm not going to rule on that now.

I'm just going to say to the extent that you intend to make such a motion, just give us time. Don't do it the night or day before the surrender date.

But with that said, without any further applications, I think we're adjourned.

Stay safe, everyone. Thank you.

MS. MERMELSTEIN: Thank you, your Honor.

MS. HELLER: Thank you.

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you.

(Adjourned)